Hegel, Marx, and ‘Theses on Feuerbach’
Is Hegel free from Marx’s criticisms?
“Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”
(Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern.)
Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (11th thesis).
Without any doubt, Hegel is not free from this criticism at nearly any degree. But the greater question here is “ Where exactly Hegel in this quotation?” and answering this question prerequisites building a robust and well-founded understanding of what Marx said. To establish this foundation, and so to answer in a punctual fashion, I first examined what Marx implied by “change” other than what a reader, at first sight, could understand from it. After unraveling the essence of this quotation, I then analyzed sui generis Hegelian epistemology and tried to put it into a Marxist context. Hence it became clear that this word was tailor-made criticism for Hegel.
This frequently cited thesis of Marx can be best understood in its broader context. Since it is the final sentence of his criticism to Feuerbach, previously said ten other theses are indeed paving the road to this conclusion.
In his second thesis on Feuerbach, Marx claims that whether objective reality can be attained by human thought or not is in itself a practical question. Man should prove the truth of his thinking by putting it into practice. Now, by saying this Marx opens the door of objective truth to the subjective individual. This subjective individual is subjective because of two factors: he is representative only of himself and he does not receive his moral or cognitive ideas from an outer referentiality but he produces it by putting it into practice. This primarily means that objective truth itself is the production of man. He also says that man must prove the truth, power, and this-sidedness of his claim by putting it into practice. A reverse reading would
say that if a thought is put into practice and proved to be a successful objective thought then it is true, powerful, and this-sided, meaning materialist. So he closely links the objective truth to this world and praises it as being “true and powerful”.Marx continues his theses by saying human essence is no abstraction inherent in every single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of social relations. (Thesis VI) By saying that Marx is actually denying the idea that any presumed outer externality or referentiality may lead or affect the human essence. Because for Marx, this would be reducing each member of society to mere individuals and eliminating their sociality. Since an external referentiality such as religion or transcendent Idea exists by itself and true for itself but not practically produced, it is not relevant to human actions thus it can only be a scholastic affair. Man, however, can produce the objective truth in history (Thesis VI, linked to Thesis II) and he does it in society. Thus an individual cannot be reduced to a mere individual whose essence is given to him but rather he is a part of society who produced his truth by practice.
In the following thesis, thesis VII, Marx advocates that even some thoughts or values that are thought to be given by outer being or claim to be ahistorical are subjects of history. Now Marx makes a distinction here: reality and belief. For him, a man may think that his religious or supernatural identity is sacred and he may count himself as a member of a divine fraternity but how loft and divine he may feel in himself, the thought of this divinity and this imagined fraternity are also products of history, thus rather historic. What is historic is produced and what is produced is material in terms of ideology and identity. Thus, it is possible to infer that, for Marx, a man whose thoughts are linked to his individual essence( which this person thinks that it is given or created by or attached to a transcendent being) is actually restricting himself with his narrower society. Explicitly, this man redefines the society he belongs to but he uses this assumed ahistoric parameters by defining it. But since these parameters are also produced and historic, this kind of person is indeed lying to himself.
This kind of person is static. But social life, on the other hand, is essentially practical. Thus this person will further comprehend the rational solutions by being dynamic. This inevitably results in the emancipation of man from this static state, redefining his society in a broader sense and divorcing his myths.
Now if we get back to the root of the question, Thesis XI, we can interpret it more accurately. Interpreting one observation aims to generate a tangible idea about the observed. This interpretation is naturally static because it is relative. More importantly, it is not tested so it is not practical. However, each philosopher struggles to attain an objective fact by means of subjective thinking. Actually, this is why Marx said: “in various ways”. In various ways because philosophers hitherto only observed and interpreted but did not try to produce. Thus, however, what they tried to achieve is to attain an ahistorical fact, what they only attained is a historical perimeter. Because they neither showed this-sidedness of their ideas nor proved the truth or power of them. For example, a philosopher who observes religion, ahistorical identity, or similar notions cannot produce anything but alike only by interpreting which causes his failure because it was not his aim in the first place but he aimed to attain an objective thought.
What Marx suggests is to change the world. This should not be understood as a unique call to arms. This quote also needs to be understood under the light of the abovementioned analysis. For Marx, the first step to change the world is to understand the complexity of the social relations and restrictions put upon the shoulder of the individual. Because this individual is the owner of multiple identities that he thinks are given. Given, as a term, is perceived by this individual as ahistorical and transcendent. Yet Marx first challenges this discourse by saying “ Indeed all these are produced in history” Then if a problem is present in the history and in the society, inevitable the remedy and solution is in the history and in the society as well. Thus, if the source of all kinds of problems and oppression are historically produced then as a natural result of it, all solutions to problems and oppression are to be looked for in history and society. This kind of interpretation is by itself a call for a change of understanding before the fact.
Thus, itis by essence a dynamic, not static, act which cannot be in various ways. Marx’s final thesis addresses not only to philosophers. He speaks generally and says” the point is to change it” and he does not limit this responsibility with philosophers alone.
Marx’s epistemology deploys man with his actions and practices in Marx’s essentially materialistic history-reading into the center of history. For Hegelian idealistic epistemology, man’s attempt to centralize himself counts as a transgression and self-victimization. This great difference is rooted in the great distance between the two epistemologies.
In Reason in History Hegel argues that the Reason is the law of the world and therefore in world history, things come about rationally. Reason is not a man-made accumulation. It has strict ties to God in its power and substantiality. In world of matters, power or might and substantiality are the only two requirements for something to come existence. So a quick equation leads us to follow this “if path”: If Reason is the law of world history and if it is linked to a transcendent being, namely God, and if God attributes power and substantiality to this Reason, then the history of world is a practice arena of God rather than man of Marx. Moreover, Hegel suggests that there is Reason in nature which is ruled by unchanged and universal laws.
But nature is not merely a nature for Hegel. Nature has special ties with Geist and world history flows in the realm of Geist. But the geist and the course of its development is the substance of history. So answer to the question “what is the spirit?” would generate an answer for “what is the history for Hegel”. Geist can be understood as ahistorical, progressive, and cumulative selfthe consciousness of historical single man. This is not sufficient, though. Since the spirit is for and in itself, it is free in essence because it does not receive it’s existence from an outer source. Then, naturally world history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom.
Marx would not probably criticize this final sentence as it is written here now. Because for Marx too, history produces freedom for exploited classes as long as their struggle is given in history and the history hitherto is the history of class struggle. However, this sentence alone would mean to Hegel and to Marx nearly opposite meanings. For Hegel, world history should be analyzed under two categories: concept and substance. Substantial world history is what we experience and what we do, what is done to us, and is totally a product of human action. But the concept of it quite different. Now, a very materialistic and individual-centric approach is being altered with the ultimate idealistic one by the introduction of the “concept of world history”. Because for Hegel, the “concept of world history” is God’s will. The word “will” directly refers to consciousness. And moreover, Idea of history cannot be thought without this transcendent divine will, which Marx argues in his Theses to Feuerbach and referrers them as being “products of history”. For both Marx and Hegel, the practice field of the human beings is world and history, ie time and space. Moreover, at first glance individual is the key player in this dualism. But as it is noticed rapidly, responsibilities, conceptualizations, historical duties of human beings are quite different. Freedom can realize itself only throughout history and each individual belongs to one part of this history. These unique individuals have the same core “human nature” with their future progenies and ancestors. These individuals are objects in history in which God’s will operate and their fathers and sons will share the same timeline in which again God’s will have operated or will operate. Thus, in essence, the human is living in a linear where he is passive by terms shaping the course of history but active by terms of making it realized. This kind of understanding brings Hegel to a place where he says “ each individual is the son of a definite people of history and he cannot penetrate it further” Because being late or hustling into the future is indeed an act against the will of God, Spirit, and idea. And the ultimate effect of this is the deviation from the path of self-consciousness and missing salvation. In Reason in History, Hegel says that philosophy is a means to apprehend the thought of one’s time. One should always stick with his time and should not try to go further for this would only produce fancy.
This is what exactly Marx was a critic about. To comprehend the time and do not go beyond the given time limit when he was authoring theses, Feuerbach.
But what makes Hegel say that “ what is real is rational and what is rational is real” is what makes Marx conduct his critics.
If what is rational is real, then it is a product of Rational. Since Rational is the law of world history and has divinity in it, then what is real is also rational. Thus, world history in its essence a product of God to fulfill total freedom. In the Hegelian world, then, human being is an actor who tries to conduct self-consciousness and who tries to combine self-categorical cognition with zeitgeist to reach freedom. Marx, however, claims that society, cognition, and freedom are historically built notions. The only will to be called as the engine of history is not spirit or idea but is the struggle of human from the historically produced sanctions, class.
Hegel navigates naturally in his epistemological stream when the topic is the role of men. In his four-class categorization, Hegel creates a special room for historical heroes, which is a vital point. In Marxist understanding, Hegelian regular person is static in his worldly affairs and what he does is to contribute to and to integrate into the existing spirit of nation. One exception is historical heroes who grasp lofty universal and practice it in accordance with the law of the spirit. They see the very truth of their age and play a part in the leap-forward into the next age, which is already waiting ready to be born in the “ womb of time” As can be inferred from this natural flow of Hegelian logic, it is still the God who makes the change and He does it by the hands of historical heroes. In this sense, historical hero is active in terms of operating the passages between the ages but He is essentially higher spirit who decides the timing and new conditions of the new age. This requires absolute submission of regular men until divinity wills the opening of a new era for mankind and a new phase for ultimate freedom.
For Marx, however, this is flawed in many ways. Firstly, this idea not only doesn’t mobilize, but also it hinders the possible mobilization for change of the status quo. Meaning, this kind of epistemology, Hegelian epistemology is, in essence, attacking the very base of the area of human though practices and thus attacking to a possible path for salvation. Secondly, Hegel strictly distinguishes what is objective truth and what is subjective action from each other. Marx, on the other hand,considers objective truth by an attainable notion by the practice of subjective.
So he further integrates them into each other. Hegel’s world history reading is perceived as a legitimation of the ent and ongoing status quo by Marx and looking at the age, this is the legitimation of bourgeois status quo. However, these are historically produced terms and cannot be separated from where they have been originated.
This is an explicit invitation to challenge. In my opinion, one of the greatest criticism of Marx to Hegel would be his sixth thesis where he says that human essence is not abstraction inherent in every single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of social relations. This would not only be a critic of Hegel’s idea of “ ahistoric human nature” but also would recreate the role of the man in world history in a more conflictual, rational,and materialistic way. Because if there is no single human nature to which God’s hand touched, then each age of history could produce new roles for this central human being and so he can well work for his next era without submission to spirit of bourgeois or without waiting for new historical hero who will reproduce the existing exploitation mechanism but in a more advanced fashion. For the last thesis on Feuerbach, it sounds like it is written especially for Hegel.